2. A breakthrough in the theory of super property rights
In view of the deficiency of property right theory, scholars such as Taitenglang (1996), Martin and Parker (1997) put forward the argument of super property right based on competition theory. They believe that the theory of super property rights is more logical in theory and more convincing in empirical explanation than the theory of privatized property rights, which further develops and enriches the basic viewpoints of property rights theory. According to the theory of super-property rights, there is not necessarily a positive correlation between profit incentives and operators' efforts. Only under the premise of market competition can profit incentive play its role in increasing the efforts and investment of operators. The theory of super-property rights takes competition as the logical starting point of motivation, and its foundation is the competition theory (Vicker, 1996) developed in the 1990s. The specific content of competition theory includes four parts: competition incentive theory, competition development theory, competition incentive theory and competition information perfection theory. These competitive theories not only provide a theoretical basis for the development of "competitive incentive" in the theory of super-property rights, but also provide a logical basis for the separation of corporate governance mechanism and property rights. Market competition gives enterprises the choice of "life" and "death". Faced with this choice, no matter who the owner of the enterprise is, as long as he wants to survive and develop without being marginalized and eliminated, he must improve the governance mechanism of the enterprise, whether it is administrative or commercial. The final development result of this choice leads to the convergence of corporate governance mechanism and interests. Otherwise, enterprises with poor governance mechanisms will be eliminated. According to this logic, after considering the competitive factors, the long-term final effect of market evolution is that the governance mechanism is not determined by the ownership of property rights. This is in line with Fama's statement (1980) that "the ownership of enterprise property rights does not mean anything to modern industrial enterprises". However, this long-term conclusion does not rule out the short-term conclusion that property rights affect the governance mechanism. Because the market competition has not reached equilibrium in a short period of time, there are still differences in mechanism and interests among enterprises, which are likely to be affected by the ownership of property rights or other factors, but these differences will eventually be eliminated by competition.
The theory of super property rights has two basic contents, one is corporate governance, and the other is competition theory. Corporate governance mainly includes contract incentive mechanism theory under asymmetric information, manager employment theory under asymmetric information, supervision organization and property right structure. There are four main aspects of competition theory. The first is the competitive incentive theory. It is a hidden incentive besides profit incentive, that is, an incentive induced by competition. There are three sources of power, namely, information comparison power, survival power and reputation power; The second is the theory of competitive incentive. The opposition of interests among enterprises, information asymmetry and potential breach of contract (short-term breach of contract interests may exceed long-term cooperation interests) stimulate competition; The third is the theory of competitive development. The higher the degree of market competition, the change of market share and performance >>
Question 2: What is the land property right theory? Marx's land property right theory is a scientific theoretical system, which mainly includes the theory of land property right system and its change, the theory of land property right function, the theory of land property right combination and separation, the theory of land property right commercialization and the theory of land property right allocation marketization. The above theory has great theoretical and far-reaching practical significance for guiding the reform of land property right system in China.
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Question 3: Western property rights theory has been discussed a lot in China's theoretical circles, and the introduction and spread of foreign property rights economics is also quite rapid and extensive. However, due to different understandings, the concept and theory of property rights are also "different people have different opinions", so it is difficult to reach an agreement. The modern western theory of property right economy, which came into being in 1930s, is a new branch of western economics. Ronald dating back to the United States? Coase, Harold? The modern western theory of property rights economy represented by Demsetz and others mainly comes from two sources: one is classical economics and neoclassical economics. Although Coase and others established their own theory in the reflection on market hypothesis and thought that their trading friction did not exist, in fact, they still inherited the theory of free competition and the hypothesis of "economic man" in traditional economics, and accepted their "local equilibrium theory" and marginal analysis method. The second is institutional economics or institutional school. For example, Kang Mangsi, a master of institutional school, summarized "transaction" in his classic book "Institutional Economics", thus providing material for property right theory to create "transaction cost". 1937165438+10. In October, Coase published the article "The Nature of Enterprises" in the British magazine Economics, which became an important symbol of the emergence of property rights theory. 1960, Coase published the article "Social Cost", which is a sign of the development or gradual maturity of modern western property rights theory. Because in this classic paper, Coase initiated the concept of transaction cost, which is the core concept and theoretical basis of modern western property rights theory. Therefore, it is particularly important to understand and grasp the transaction cost. In Coase's view, transactions are scarce and the operation of the market has costs. Therefore, the transaction cost is the cost of using the market price mechanism. It includes two main contents: (1) the cost of finding discount value and obtaining accurate market information; (2) In market transactions, the cost of negotiation, bargaining and contract performance among traders. It should be pointed out that although the concept of transaction cost is not standardized and clear, its in-depth discussion and research have formed a powerful explanation for many economic phenomena. This of course also benefits from the Coase theorem summarized by later generations. Coase theorem is a theorem about the internal relationship among transaction cost, property right definition and resource allocation efficiency. Usually divided into two theorems, Coase Theorem 1: If the transaction cost is zero, then the market mechanism will automatically optimize the allocation of resources no matter how the property rights are defined; Coase Theorem 2: If the transaction cost is positive, different definitions of power will lead to different effective allocation of resources. Coase theorem has become the basic theory of property rights economics. Coase theorem is gradually formed in the process of analyzing "externalities" Externality refers to the influence that the parties engaged in production activities bring to others or society. For example, the sewage discharged by paper mills pollutes rivers, reduces farmers' grain output or harms the health of residents along the river. Externality is due to the unclear division of property rights of economic subjects, which makes it possible to infringe on the interests of others. One of the functions of property rights is to clearly define everyone's right to benefit or suffer, and internalize externalities. Therefore, the existence of externalities and how to solve them are also important contents of property rights theory. Western scholars generally discuss property rights based on the above two concepts, and then put forward their own different views on property rights. The authoritative Oxford Law Dictionary says that property rights hold "ownership". The dictionary explains that real right "also known as property ownership, refers to the complete rights existing in or on any object, including possession, use, lending, transfer, exhaustion, consumption and other property-related rights". S.Pejovich et al. theoretically expounded in more detail the viewpoint that property right is equal to ownership, and then interpreted ownership as a kind of right constraint, which includes a wide range of social relations between people due to property. Pei Jieweiqi pointed out: "Property right is the relationship between people caused by the existence of scarce goods and their specific uses." "Property rights show in detail the code of conduct corresponding to things that everyone must abide by in interpersonal relationships, or bear the punishment cost of not complying with this code." This standard is ownership. Pei Jieweiqi believes that ownership includes the rights of four parties: first, the right to use one's own assets and the right to use others' assets under certain conditions are collectively called the right to use; The second is the right to return on assets, collectively referred to as the right to return; The third is the right to change the form and essence of assets, that is, the right to dispose of them; The fourth is the right to transfer all or part of assets, that is, the right to trade. Pei Jieweiqi believes that as the unified ownership of the above four rights, it is actually ...
Question 4: What is property right? The relationship between property rights and property ownership, China jurists and economists still have the same view, roughly the following views:
From the viewpoint that property right equals ownership, this paper evaluates and criticizes the western property right theory, and analyzes the basis and core ownership of property right in China's economic reform, that is, to understand the narrow sense of ownership from the subordinate relationship of people's possession of assets.
Second, property rights are equated with possession and management rights. People who think that property rights have two meanings have two meanings: ownership refers to possession and management. Theoretically, the two meanings are different at the same time: the same ownership applies to the property right of the first meaning; The same ownership applies internally to the second meaning of property rights.
Third, the identification of real right is different from ownership, which has a broader meaning than ownership and has aroused widespread concern. Some people think that recognizing property rights and ownership have the same connotation, and ownership belongs to assets, while property rights include broader rights than ownership, including possession, control, operation, income and disposal. Except for ownership, most people hold this view, which is close to the property right system expressed by western scholars.
It is more scientific and feasible to summarize the definition of property rights from the perspective of promoting or promoting property rights transactions;
First of all, property rights are related to property, and the exclusiveness of property rights means that a specific right subject can only exclude any non-right subject from possessing and using property rights; And the object of real right is diversified, that is, the subject has multiple real rights, and real rights can only belong to the subject.
Secondly, property rights can flow or transfer rights. When property owners realize whether they need to own it, property rights should flow and transfer with each other, so as to realize efficient allocation of resources.
Second, the property rights of enterprises with distribution rights are horizontally divided into use rights, income rights, disposal rights and transfer rights, and vertically divided into investment rights, management rights and management rights; From the perspective of its existence mode, it is divided into value property right and physical property right.
Fourth, any property right must have boundaries and measurement rights, otherwise, not only can a specific property right be separated from its property right for trading, but also the property right can be measured effectively in the trading process.
Defining the connotation of property right from the above four aspects is very important for understanding and grasping the property right transaction, because the property right transaction is determined by the inherent attribute of property right, and the first premise of property right transaction is that it is not clear that the property right of the right subject can be traded; 2. Property rights can flow and transfer, so that property rights transactions can really become possible; Third, it is precisely because of the division of property rights that people not only sell property rights as a whole, but also sell their divided parts and even units; Due to the boundary of property rights and the object of measurement, the transaction process is practical.
Question 5: Harold? Demsetz's Theory of Property Rights harold demsetz? Demsetz's wonderful paper "Towards the Theory of Property Rights" (American Economic Review, May 1967) answers "What is a transaction?" Although the theory of property rights is obviously from Coase's famous paper ronald coase, the problem of social cost; 1960), but it is not clear who the credit for this theory should belong to. Coase also proved that because there are too many economic parties involved, the required "transaction cost" (the cost of organizing the economic trading market) is prohibitive, so it is impossible to determine the ownership of unintentional by-products of economic activities; For this reason, the market cannot produce effective results. What is "transaction cost"? That is the cost of concluding a transaction, including the information cost of concluding a contract, the cost of writing a contract, and the supervision cost of ensuring the implementation of the terms. Coase showed the importance of transaction cost, but failed to summarize this view into a comprehensive statement, indicating that the formation of clearly defined property rights is a prerequisite for market operation. Harold? Demsetz's wonderful paper "Discussion on Property Rights Theory" is the first time to complete this summary. Property right depends on transaction cost, which in turn depends on the cost of obtaining market information. Therefore, the property right theory is closely related to the information cost theory, and the employment contract in the labor market can best illustrate this point. The employment contract only states the wages and working hours of the workers, but not the labor speed and intensity. Essentially, the contract is "incomplete". Although unemployment can be used as a "big stick" to threaten workers and promotion as a "carrot" to win over workers, this practice is only effective when workers' labor performance is regularly checked. In this way, the employment relationship is basically an information problem. In a groundbreaking paper H. Demsetz and A.A. Alcaian, Organization of Production, Information Cost and Economics, American Economic Review,1February 1972), Demsetz and Armen A. Alchian believe that the employment relationship can be regarded as an employer who pays "fair daily wages" and provides "fair daily labor". In other words, the labor market requires, to borrow Okun's famous words, to control the operation of other markets with invisible hands instead of invisible hands. This theory of incomplete employment contract, also known as "implicit contract theory" or "principal-agent problem", has been adopted by other economists who study labor economics and macroeconomics.
Question 6: What is the economic meaning of property rights? Property right research is a common concern of economists and legal scholars in China. The word "property right" frequently appears in domestic economic and legal documents, but what are the exact meanings of these concepts? What is the relationship between property right and the original legal concepts such as ownership, property right, creditor's rights and property right? There is no unified understanding of these basic problems in property rights research in theoretical circles.
The concept of "property right" was first born in economic theory, but as a right or a concept related to rights, it is impossible to exist without the legal system and legal research. Therefore, the two fields of law and economics have never stopped the comparative study of property rights and traditional legal concepts, and have formed several representative views. The first view is that property right is property ownership, which is about property right, and property right can be equated with ownership, because ownership can be broadly understood, that is, ownership refers to people's possession and subordination of assets. Most economists hold this view (such as Cheng Enfu,1997; Wu,1995; Zhang,1995; Huang Shaoan,1997); The second view is that property rights are close to property rights. Zhou (2000) thinks that "although the category of ownership is constantly developing, it will not replace property rights in the end, but the expanding concept of property rights is getting closer and closer to the property rights we express. Therefore, the concept of real right can be used as the target reference for the development of real right "; The third view is that property rights are creditor's rights. Liu Wei and Heping Xinqiao (1998) believe that "in a broad sense, property rights contain two meanings, one is ownership, and the other is creditor's rights. In a narrow sense, property rights are actually creditor's rights and a dynamic embodiment of ownership in the market movement "; The fourth view holds that property right is property right, and property right is a compound property right including property right, creditor's rights and various specific rights derived from it. For example, Wang Liming (1998) said in his Theory of Property Law: "The concept of legal property right is not complicated. The so-called property right is property right, which is also reflected in some laws and regulations of our country and is also popular in the field of law.
Law is the most important formal institutional arrangement in a society, and property right arrangement is the foundation and core of institutional arrangement. The definition and protection of property rights is one of the core contents of the legal system, that is to say, whether the property rights arrangement is effective depends largely on the effectiveness and rationality of the legal system. Economists and legal scholars have different understandings and understandings of the concept of property rights. Theoretically speaking, this is a subject worthy of study, and it is also meaningful to economic reform, especially to the practice of enterprise reform and development. We find that it is particularly necessary to study this topic when "property right" develops to the level of "enterprise property right". The purpose of this paper is to objectively analyze the relationship between real right and traditional legal concepts such as ownership, property right, creditor's rights and property right, and to discuss this issue in depth.
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Question 7: How to use the theory of property rights to analyze problems? We can relate it to the pyramid organizational structure of business groups. Generally speaking, the explanation that the control right is accompanied by the conflict of interest is that the major shareholders use this structure to strengthen the control right, hollowing out the enterprise and infringing on the rights and interests of minority shareholders. If you have read Aqin's analysis, you will think about whether there are other causes of pyramid organization and whether it is related to the restriction of enterprise transfer right. Qin said that the transfer right of state-owned enterprises is restricted, but he didn't say that state-owned enterprises can't be efficient. Since state-owned enterprises also want to be efficient, those who control enterprises will have the incentive to delegate power to the managers of enterprises. Generally speaking, this decentralization is through the transfer of equity, that is, privatization; However, the regulation of state-owned enterprises is that equity and assets cannot be transferred to private individuals, which is a restriction on the right to transfer. This limits the transfer of power, and if * * * decentralization is necessary and motivated, we must find other methods, which may be administrative orders or through organizational levels. Why is it more effective to decentralize enterprise rights through organizational structure than administrative orders? Because this can impose some costs on the owner of * * * to transmit information and supervise the implementation, making it more difficult for * * * to get involved. If you do this analysis and thinking, you will form a new hypothesis, which does not exist in the literature, but those basic property rights theories have prompted you and are waiting for you to analyze it in its way.
Of course, at this time, you have found an example: in China, Gree Group controlled Gree Electric (a listed company) many years ago, and Gree Group was the parent company. This is a simple pyramid structure. Look at the structure of executives and directors of Gree listed companies. At that time, the parent company only sent the chairman of Gree Group and the managers of three affiliated companies, one ***4 people. There are nine people on the board of directors, so in terms of personnel, does the equity of the parent company match the personnel? The parent company owns 60% of the shares of listed companies, but the former personnel occupy less than half of the seats on the board of directors of listed companies, so it seems that the rights of shareholders have actually been delegated to enterprises, which does not match the shares. Therefore, equity does not actually represent the actual management right of the enterprise. From this case, we find that Aqin's theory may explain the organizational pyramid decentralization structure of state-owned enterprises. In addition, a similar example can be observed in private enterprises: Hong Kong PCCW split Hong Kong Telecom. PCCW, the parent company controlled by Li Zekai, the second son of China's richest man, Li Ka-shing, spun off the previously acquired Hong Kong Telecom and sold the company's income rights to the public in the form of equity trust, but the parent company still controls Hong Kong Telecom. Why are you doing this? Because Hong Kong * * stipulates that the transfer of telecom control rights can only be dominated by * * *, Li Zekai can't sell control rights, but can only sell income rights, forming a parent-subsidiary company controlled by trust. * * * Restrict the transfer of control rights of Hong Kong Telecom. The parent company holds the control rights of telecom assets, but the transfer of income rights is free. These two rights can be separated through pyramid company structure and trust transactions.
Question 8: What is the relationship between property right theory and non-organizations? The relationship between property right and ownership is both related and different. Judging from the objective economic relationship reflected by the two, there are many aspects that are related and overlapping, and there are also differences in development and specific application, mainly as follows:
(l) Ownership emphasizes the relationship between ownership and object, while property rights emphasize many rights in the sense of ownership.
(2) Ownership emphasizes the stable and essential dialectical relationship between subjective and objective, while property rights emphasize the changing, dynamic or time-limited relationship between subjective and objective.
(3) Taking the modern market economy as the boundary, the past "ownership" has the characteristics of closure and solidification, while "property right" embodies the decomposition and combination of open property rights and developed property rights. Ownership theory should reveal the essence of production relations, thus revealing the fundamental law of social development and clarifying the revolutionary significance of the change and replacement of production relations. The theory of property rights is different. It specifically studies each specific property right subject, property right relationship, property right boundary and its corresponding rights and responsibilities. Therefore, although both ownership and property rights involve the concept of ownership, they are aimed at property relations and are closely related, but there are great differences.
Question 9: How to understand the theory of human capital property rights;
Property right refers to people's right to property, including property ownership, control and income right. Property right is a core concept in the field of enterprise efficiency, which is not only related to practical issues such as enterprise governance and income distribution, but also an important basis for studying basic theoretical issues such as enterprise nature, objectives and environment.
The theory of human capital property right is based on human capital theory and property right theory. Human capital can be simply defined as human resources that can obtain surplus value. When human resources are put into enterprises, human capital of enterprises is formed. In other words, the ownership and control of human capital belongs to individuals as the carrier of human capital, which obviously has the characteristics of property rights. Therefore, there is the concept of human capital property right. The property right of human capital is inseparable and transferable, and it is difficult to decompose the functions between different subjects.
Under the condition of market economy, the separation of ownership, use right and control right of human capital is a typical feature of human capital property right arrangement. However, for the owners of labor, technology, management and other human capital elements, the ultimate goal of their human capital investment or ownership is not only to pursue the ownership of a certain element, but to realize some economic benefits on the basis of this ownership, that is, to require human capital demanders to pay remuneration, which is determined according to the quantity and quality of human capital they occupy and consume. In this way, the property right owned by the owner of human capital includes two aspects, one is the complete property right of human capital, and the other is the distribution right of residual income similar to material capital.
Question 10: What is the relationship between principal-agent theory and property right theory? If we must talk about relationships, then the property right theory is the basis and premise of the principal-agent theory.
According to the theory of property rights, the property owners of private enterprises enjoy the possession of surplus profits, and they have strong motivation to continuously improve the efficiency of enterprises. Therefore, in terms of profit incentives, private enterprises are stronger than traditional state-owned enterprises.
Principal-agent theory is one of the main contents of contract theory in institutional economics, which advocates the separation of ownership and management right, and the enterprise owner retains the residual claim and transfers the management right. The principal-agent relationship mainly studied means that one or more actors appoint and hire other actors to serve them according to an express or implied contract, and at the same time grant the latter certain decision-making power, and pay them corresponding remuneration according to the quantity and quality of services provided by the latter. The authorized person is the principal and the authorized person is the agent.
That is to say, the theory of property right is that the business owner defines the ownership of the enterprise, and then on this basis, with specialization, the business owner retains the ownership of the enterprise and entrusts the management right and use right to someone with corresponding ability, thus making profits for the enterprise more efficiently.
Simply put, the shareholders of an enterprise are the owners of the enterprise, and the property right theory is to confirm that they have the ownership of the enterprise. These shareholders may not have the corresponding ability or time to manage the enterprise, so they recruit the general manager, which is equivalent to entrusting the enterprise to the general manager for management, but they still enjoy the ownership. The general manager enjoys the right to manage and use the enterprise through the agent, and may require the shareholders to pay remuneration. This is the principal-agent theory.
I hope my answer is helpful to you ~ I hope it will be adopted ~O(∩_∩)O~