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With chaotic positioning and poor strategy, does Polaris still have a chance in the China market?
Polestar was founded more than 20 years ago, when it was the racing department of Volvo Cars. Now it is a high-end electric brand owned by Geely and Volvo Cars, and it was successfully listed on NASDAQ last year under the operation of Geely.

Not long ago, Polaris just officially released its first SUV model Polaris 3 in China. However, this new car does not seem to bring positive market feedback to Polaris. As of March 17, less than one year before Polaris was listed on the US stock market, its share price has dropped from the initial opening price of 12.98 to 3.72, and its market value has evaporated by 70%.

According to this trend, Polaris may become Geely's Waterloo in the investment field of high-end electric vehicles.

The mystery of sales volume

Nothing can better reflect the embarrassing situation of Polaris in the domestic market than sales volume.

Thomas Ingrat, CEO of Polaris, once said: "Polaris aims to sell 290,000 vehicles worldwide in 2025, which is 10 times higher than 202 1 year." To achieve this goal, it is obviously inseparable from the China market. However, according to the data, in 2022, the global sales volume of Polaris was 565,438+0.500, and the operating loss increased by 29%, reaching $654,38+0.286 billion, but the official did not announce the specific sales volume in China market.

I believe the reason for not publishing is easy to guess, because the sales figures in China market are too ugly. Although it is not officially said, from the insurance data, we can generally know that in 2022, the number of Polaris in China is only 1, 7 19. This figure can only be said to be better than nothing. As a car company with a production base in China and the support of a major shareholder like Geely, it is a bit unreasonable to have only such sales in the domestic market.

Even since it entered the China market on 20 17, the cumulative sales volume of Polaris in China has not exceeded four figures. You should know that the first model of Polaris, Polaris 1, sold for as much as 1.45 million yuan when it went on the market. This is an ultra-luxury brand that claims to compete with Tesla. Needless to say, how much Tesla can sell in China a year, let's take a look at another ultra-luxury Porsche Taycan, 202 1, which sold 73 15 cars in the domestic market.

Some people may say that this model with a height of more than one million yuan is not the main model at all. Tesla has to rely on Model 3 and Model Y. Then another model of Polaris, Polaris 2, has a guide price of 29.98-35.88 million. At present, the market discount has exceeded 65.438 million yuan, but it still can't support the sales of Polaris.

Such sales performance doomed Polaris to be marginalized in China market.

Chaos in pricing

Behind the low sales volume is the chaotic product positioning and pricing strategy.

In 20 18, the first model of Polaris, Polaris 1, went on the market, and the price was as high as 1.45 million yuan, which was the price that no one would buy for a new brand at that time. Moreover, Polaris may be sold in limited quantities to show its high-end positioning. As you can imagine, no one paid the bill.

Of course, this strategy of first launching ultra-high-end models to shape high-end positioning, and then launching relatively low-cost mass production models is understandable. For example, the domestic brand Weilai first developed an EP9 electric supercar, and then sold the mass production model ES8. But after all, the time to market of these two models is similar, and EP9 can be said to be very successful.

After the first model of Polaris didn't respond, it took two years to launch Polaris 2 for impulse. It's just that this model with a starting price of less than 300,000 was advertised on the online platform, and now the price has been reduced by more than100,000, which still hasn't attracted the attention of the market. To make matters worse, its products are not up to standard. Since June 5438+ 10, 2020, it has experienced three product recalls. The number of recalls has covered almost all vehicles sold in China, and it has also been rated as one of the top ten most unreliable pure electric vehicles by Consumer Report.

More interestingly, Polaris 3 was officially listed in China not long ago, and the price returned to the high-end positioning, starting from 698,000-798,000 yuan. Although this price is1.8-28,000 yuan lower than the overseas price, it is still close to the ceiling of the new energy market in China. In contrast, even the Gaohe car suddenly became cost-effective. In China's new energy market, which has the largest volume in the world, Polaris 3 has been unable to crush the bright spots of its competitors in terms of product strength, which also makes such a high price questioned. Even at the press conference, the media directly underestimated the prospects of this car.

From the pricing of Polaris 3, it is not difficult to predict that the prices of Polaris 4 and Polaris 5 to be released next will not be much lower. This large-span repetition of prices not only reflects the logical confusion of polar star products and pricing strategies, but also reflects polar star's arrogance and trust in the domestic market.

The chaos of coaching change

The root of strategic confusion must still come from decision makers. The confusion of internal decision-making can be seen from the six-year five-year change of the head of Polaris China District.

In 20 17, Volvo appointed Shen Feng as the first CEO of Polaris China, but Shen Feng left at the end of that year. Later, Wu Zhenyu, Vice President of Volvo Asia Pacific Products Department, took over. During his reign, he launched Polaris 1 and Polaris 2, and took Tesla as the benchmark of Polaris.

In 2020, a former Bentley employee from Volkswagen China praised Wu Zhenhao as his successor. This year, Polaris 2 was officially delivered, and then quality problems began to break out. Golf resigned after less than a year in office, and he was replaced by Nathan Forshaw, who was the head of Polaris' global strategy and development department and an executive of Volvo Group.

Nathan Forshaw was in office for just over a year. In August, 2022, China, the star, changed coaches again, and Feng Dan, who once worked for Cadillac brand, took over. Three things have happened to Polaris since Feng Dan took office. One is that a well-known car anchor broke the news on the network platform, saying that the battery pack of Polaris 2 owner was damaged after the car accident, and was quoted a sky-high price for replacing electricity during maintenance, causing an uproar in online public opinion; Another thing is that Polaris 2 quietly raised its price, with the highest increase of 30 thousand yuan, and then began to sell at a "broken price" at the end of the year. The third is the high-priced listing of Polaris 3.

China, the number one star, has changed five directors in six years. Such a high frequency of "coaching change" is not conducive to the stability of enterprise decision-making direction. Among these executives, there are executives in Volvo's own system and leaders from brands such as Cadillac and Volkswagen; There are local elites in China and overseas executives. Each of them may have different attitudes and decisions about the market. This is the root of Polaris's strategic confusion.

In the end, after taking over the mess of his predecessor, every senior executive can only become the "back burner" of China, a superstar.

Conclusion:

Polaris, founded on 20 17, started early in the domestic new energy market and caught up with a late episode. Moreover, after six years of operation in the China market, the brand Polaris still lacks a sense of existence; Strategically, Polaris is chaotic; Attitude, Polaris is not even as sincere as BBA and others. I'm afraid it's hard for such a polar star to find a breakthrough in the China market. (Text/Youshi car old gun)

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This article is from the author of Icano. The copyright of AUV belongs to the author. Please contact the author in any form. The content only represents the author's point of view and has nothing to do with the car reform.