The core of new humanism is to respect human nature, and its theoretical basis is the theory of human nature. Pay attention to people's potential, the joy and pain of senses and emotions, and the most important thing is the continuous improvement of people's ideological realm. Here, we will not only praise the nobility and perfection of human nature, nor will we say anything exaggerated, such as "man is the measure of everything." But they will praise people's value and dignity, and they will treat wealth and enjoyment with a positive attitude towards life. Resolutely oppose the "unconscious" performance art advocated by cynicism, skepticism, asceticism, asceticism and surrealism.
Expand ideas on the rationality of ideas.
Irving babbitt (1865— 1933) is an American literary critic, a representative of new humanism and a professor of comparative literature at Harvard University. He believes that since the Renaissance, the West has overemphasized the "principle of things" to the detriment of the "principle of people", advocated returning to the original position of people, advocated people's moral imagination and humanistic rationality, and opposed utilitarian aesthetics. Babbitt once taught China students such as Mei Guangdi, Tang Yongtong, Wu Mi and Liang Shiqiu, and his thoughts were introduced to China through Xue Heng.
Babbitt's new humanism emphasizes the moral completion of human beings, the humanistic care of education and culture, and opposes scientism and utilitarianism, even the gradual and rapid modernization process in the early 20th century. This idea of "moving against the historical trend" has been accused of being out of date when it first attracted attention, including scholars who sympathize with this idea.
Babbitt himself knows that his ideas are out of date, but with some insistence similar to China's "knowing what not to do", he still demonstrates and perfects the new humanism theory, not seeking to put it into practice or have an impact in reality, or even wanting to call it, but just perfecting the theory itself, even though it is always in an "ideological state"-this is the spiritual phenomenon towards ideological rationality.
Conceptual rationality: as a positive form of value rationality
Since Frankfurt School divided the category of human thought into instrumental rationality and value rationality in the functional sense, the expression of thought in humanities and social sciences seems to have been effectively stimulated and liberated. In the academic field of culturology and literary research, which has always been inclined to the frontier theory, the concept of value rationality advocated by Max Weber and its corresponding expression are popular. Unfortunately, advocates put forward this proposition when dissecting social and economic problems, which is too rough to express literary or cultural ideology. If instrumental rationality is based on social operation and economic operation, and value rationality is based on theoretical advocacy and ideological call, then before the formation of value rationality, there should be a form of ideological rationality that is still in the process of its accumulation, discussion and tempering.
As a positive form of value rationality, conceptual rationality is similar to the conceptual proposition in classical philosophy. In fact, it is the conceptual basis of value rationality when it has not yet formed universal value or has not yet been finalized, and its direct result is embodied in ideological form. Before "forming the will and will to achieve a specific goal", there should be some inevitable conceptual preparations, which is the neglected conceptual rationality. The formation of ideas or concepts itself needs a certain value as the foundation. However, the value foundation here often shows the characteristics of individuals or schools. When a value concept does not have enough power to become a social rationality, it will attract the attention of the world as much as possible in the form of ideas and seek to be recognized as a rational spirit. This is ideological rationality or concept. Only when this concept or idea is stereotyped and forms a certain tendency and willpower can it be condensed into a value rationality that tries to appeal to social influence. In this sense, if conceptual rationality is an ideological form, then value rationality is the "power of ideas", while instrumental rationality is the way and means for the "power of ideas" to play its role, and its result may be manifested as purpose rationality.
Max Weber, who discovered and always paid attention to the elaboration of value rationality, did not explicitly put forward the proactive form of ideological rationality before value rationality, but he was not completely unaware of it. When he put forward the concept of "ideal type", he also put forward the proposition of natural rationality in a relative sense. Although natural rationality cannot be equated with conceptual rationality, it also exists as a proactive form or foundation of value rationality in theory. It can be seen that Weber did not rule out the possibility of value rationality as a proactive form and conceptual basis before the formation of "rational type"
Expand ideas on the rationality of ideas.
The fundamental difference between Babbitt's new humanism and traditional humanism is that its ideological rationality is greater than its value rationality. Humanism has always been embodied in the conceptual characteristics of value rationality. It takes humanism as the yardstick of social operation and cultural construction, or humanitarianism and individualism as the benchmark of individual rights and dignity, and expresses a strong value proposition in the criticism and design of social civilization. Babbitt's new humanism certainly has some ideas, but it tends to criticize, construct and adjust in the sense of ideas, and does not expect such ideas to have an impact in the field of social practice. Therefore, although new humanism actively carries out civilized criticism and social criticism, it is always based on the value standpoint of literary criticism, and still embodies the characteristics of literary criticism schools to a considerable extent.
Babbitt believes that "literary critics should be particularly happy to meet philosophers" and that "philosophers have stepped out of the shadow of cold abstract concepts and become literati". In fact, their literariness has reached such a level that it seems that it is time for writers to praise great philosophers in turn, and to be the best writer, one must first become a good philosopher. What Babbitt wants to express here is that philosophers have shown a trend of alienation of value rationality and set foot in the construction of ideological rationality with a literary attitude. The closer this rationality is to literature, the farther it is from social practice. Almost all new humanists, including Babbitt's descendants of China (such as scholars of Xue Heng School), often develop their critical theories and even cultural or social thoughts around literary issues. Scholars' perspective and literary feelings often make them only good at examining the inner universe and constructing rational ideas, but not good at transforming this idea into "the power of ideas" and upgrading it to value rationality.
Babbitt also emphasized the rational quality and form of thought when expounding his humanistic thought. He believes that "humanists (as we know from history) wander between extreme sympathy and extreme discipline and choice, and become more humane according to his adjustment of these two extremes". Based on the ideological realm of human nature rather than the actual social content of human nature: "Through this ability to integrate their own opposing qualities, people show their human nature and their nature superior to other animals." "Man is a doomed one-sided creation. However, man is human because he can overcome this fate in his own nature; The degree of humanity he can achieve depends entirely on the degree to which he reconciles his opposing virtues. " What kind of virtue do you need? On this issue, Babbitt has a high degree of theoretical agreement with China's traditional Confucian proposition: "A humanist should guard against both excessive sympathy and excessive choice; He is wary of excessive freedom and excessive restrictions; He will choose limited freedom and sympathy. " It is the spiritual connotation of the coincidence of Confucian culture and new humanism to expand our thinking on ideological rationality to the inner morality of self-denial and self-cultivation, and the ideological rationality of righteousness, honesty and self-cultivation
"China Humanism" represented by Confucianism
In fact, there is a spiritual phenomenon of rational thought in China's Confucianism. Weber, like a pagan who has no concept of God, understands "China Humanism" represented by Confucianism as "Ritualism". Of course, there are many etiquette-rich thoughts in China's traditional ethics, including Confucianism. However, not to mention that China's traditional culture compares etiquette with loyalty, filial piety and honesty, and gives meaning to "etiquette" thoughts and values, rather than the so-called "ritualism" form; Even in the distant past, the central concept of "ceremony" in China's Confucianism emphasized more on the level of value rationality, and even more on the level of ideological rationality: "Contrary to the enthusiasm and ostentation of feudal warriors in ancient Islam, what we found in China was vigilant self-control, introspection and caution, especially the suppression of any form of enthusiasm (including joy), because enthusiasm would disturb the peace and harmony of the soul, which is the root of all good."
The connotation of China's traditional Confucianism is quite rich, which is far from being summarized by the key proposition recognized and promoted by Babbitt from the perspective of new humanism. Confucian tradition contains multi-level spiritual qualities such as instrumental rationality, value rationality and conceptual rationality, while those spread to modern neo-Confucianism mainly focus on the conceptual level of conceptual rationality. It is in this respect that Neo-Confucianism shows the ideological characteristics of humanism and has many similarities and compatibility with Neo-humanism. From this, we can clearly understand the common ground between neo-Confucian humanism and neo-humanism, so as to distinguish the ideological differences between traditional Confucianism and neo-Confucianism and the principle differences between new humanism and old humanism from an effective observation point.