In order to further stabilize the battlefield situation in Korea, expand the war results, and then reverse the war situation, the Central Military Commission and the Volunteer Headquarters, according to the pre-plan, General Song led the 9th Corps of Volunteers and General Chen Geng led the 3rd Corps of Volunteers to successively enter the DPRK to participate in the war, preparing for the follow-up campaign to resist US aggression and aid Korea. After Song and Chen Geng led the army into the DPRK, the Central Military Commission appointed Chen Geng as the second deputy commander-in-chief of the Volunteers and Song as the third deputy commander-in-chief of the Volunteers. At this time, Deng Hua, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Volunteers and commander of 13 Corps, was in a hurry. He immediately found Peng, commander-in-chief of the Volunteers, and asked Chen Geng to give up the position of the first deputy commander-in-chief. Song served as the second deputy commander-in-chief and himself served as the third deputy commander-in-chief. Why did Deng Hua do this?
Why does Deng Hua think that his WeChat in the military is not as good as Chen Geng and Song Shilun? Let's be clear for two years (19 10). When Deng was born, Chen Geng was seven years old and Song San was seven years old. In terms of age, Chen Geng and Song are older than Deng Huada, and they are Deng Hua's big brothers. 1923, Chen Geng is 20 years old. He joined China and had contact with Mao Zedong. That year, he was admitted to Wujiang School of Guangzhou Army. Song 16 years old also joined Wu's officer training regiment in Changsha. At this time, Deng Hua 13 years old was still studying in a private school. Three years later, Chen Geng graduated from Whampoa Military Academy 1 and stayed in school, taking part in many battles. Because of his outstanding military exploits, he served as the fourth company commander of Huangpu Military Academy. At this time, Song was admitted to the fifth phase of Whampoa Military Academy, while Deng Hua was studying at Nanhua Law and Politics School in Changsha.
1927, Chen Geng is 24 years old. He took part in the famous Nanchang Uprising and served as a battalion commander in the Uprising Army. Song, 20, was arrested and imprisoned on suspicion of * * *. At this time, 17-year-old Deng Hua went home to avoid disaster because of the sudden outbreak of "Ma Ri incident" in Changsha. 1928, Chen Geng was transferred to Shanghai Central Special Branch, while Song was still in prison. Deng Hua also participated in the Southern Hunan Uprising led by Zhu De and Chen Yi in Yizhang County, Hunan Province, and served as the organization and command in the uprising troops. The following year, after Song was released from prison, he set up guerrillas to engage in revolution and embarked on the road of armed struggle reactionaries.
1934, the Red Army failed in its fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" and was forced to make a strategic shift. Under the leadership of, Zhu De, and others, the Long March began, including the head of the Cadre Corps in Ren Hongjun, Chen Geng, the commander of the Cadre Corps in the Military Commission in Song, and the senior command scientist in Ren Hongjun University, Deng Hua (he entered the Red Army University before the Long March and was not assigned a post during the Long March). After the Lugouqiao Incident broke out, because of the needs of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army, which is the "Eighth Route Army" that we are most familiar with. Chen Geng is the brigade commander of the 386th Brigade of the Eighth Route Army/KOOC-0/29th Division, Song is the head of the 7th/KOOC-0/6th Regiment of the 358th Brigade of the Eighth Route Army/KOOC-0/20th Division, and Deng Hua is/KOOC-0/5.
From War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression's victory to the early days of the Liberation War, our army implemented a field army column system, similar to the army level. At that time, the whole army was divided into 27 field columns, and each field column generally had three combat divisions. Of course, there were also field columns with smaller combat sequences, only two or three combat brigades. At that time, Chen Geng was the commander of the fourth column, Song was the chief of staff of the front-line headquarters of the Jin-Pu Railway (the second column, the seventh and eighth divisions were in charge first, and then the first column was added), and Deng Huaren was the deputy commander of Northeast China and the commander of Shenyang police. In the counter-offensive stage of the Liberation War, according to the instructions of Chairman Mao and the CPC Central Committee, Chen Geng Corps was composed of the 4th column, the 1st 1 column and the 38th army of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, and was led by Chen Geng to advance to Henan, Shaanxi and Hubei. At this time, Song was the commander of column 10 in East China Field Army, and Deng Hua was the commander of column 7 in Northeast Field Army.
In the later period of the Liberation War, Chen Geng was the commander and political commissar of the Fourth Corps of the Second Field Army, Song was the commander of the Ninth Corps of the Third Field Army, and Deng Hua was the commander of the Fourth Field Army 15 Corps. At the awarding ceremony of 1955, Chen Geng was awarded the rank of general, and both Song and Deng Hua were awarded the rank of general.
Deng Hua believes that Chen Geng is the high flyers of Huangpu 1 and the elder statesman of our party and army. He enjoyed a high degree of WeChat in the army, and once led the Chen Geng Corps into Henan, Shaanxi and Hubei and became the commander of the independent military region. And Song is also a veteran, high flyers of Huangpu Phase 5. He narrowly escaped death in prison. As early as the Long March of the Red Army, he served as a member of the Military Commission Cadre Corps, and later served as the chief of staff of the front-line headquarters of Jinpu after War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression. Therefore, Deng Hua, who is modest, thinks that his position in the headquarters of the Volunteers should not be ahead of these two senior officers, so he immediately found Mr. Peng and asked for the first deputy commander-in-chief to be given to Chen Geng, and Song as the second deputy commander-in-chief and himself as the third deputy commander-in-chief.
Deng Hua's command ability can be said to be beyond doubt, and it has also been affirmed by his old chief Lin Biao. At the first meeting of the Military Commission to discuss sending troops to Korea, the Military Commission decided that Huang Yongsheng, commander of the 13 Corps, would lead the 13 Corps to fight in Korea first, but Lin Biao strongly recommended Deng Hua to replace Huang Yongsheng on the grounds that Deng Hua's overall concept and military quality were more comprehensive! And Lin Biao's proposal was immediately supported by Luo Ronghuan, the old political commissar of the fields, and Liu Yalou, the old chief of staff of the fields. Subsequently, the CMC decided to switch Huang Yongsheng, commander of the 13 Corps, with Deng Hua, commander of the 15 Corps, and the 13 Corps led by Deng Hua entered the DPRK.
13 Corps entered the DPRK, and Deng Hua was appointed as the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Volunteers by the Central Military Commission to assist General Peng in handling all matters concerning the deployment of the Volunteers in the DPRK. In the contact and work with General Peng, Deng Hua's comprehensive military command quality was recognized and praised by General Peng. Later, Mr. Peng once commented that Deng Hua was knowledgeable, intelligent, brave and meticulous in fighting, giving advice and being a good helper. Deng Hua's comprehensive military command quality can be recognized and praised by the three founding marshals, which can be described as a truly excellent quality. The military qualities of Chen Geng and Song are also comprehensive and excellent, even not inferior to that of Deng Hua. Why did Peng Zong not agree to Deng Hua's application for voluntary abdication?
Peng Zong's disagreement with Deng Hua's application for abdication shows that Deng Hua must have something extraordinary, that is, Deng Hua was one of the first commanders and fighters to enter the Korean battlefield and knew the ever-changing War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea like the back of his hand. He can even be said to be the commander and commander who is most familiar with the Korean battlefield except Peng Anyin. Therefore, with excellent military quality, Deng Hua is the most suitable candidate for the first deputy commander of the Volunteers. From Mr. Peng's point of view, the personnel arrangement in wartime mainly depends on the actual needs of the war. Whoever knows the battlefield better and who commands is more conducive to his own victory should be given priority. In addition, Chen Geng's health is also a major reason. On the eve of entering Korea, he did not reach the Korean battlefield until August 1952 because of the recurrence of his old illness. The physical condition of the commander is also a major factor affecting the outcome of the war, and Deng's good physical quality is also a factor. After comprehensive consideration, Mr. Peng decisively rejected Deng Hua's request for abdication.
Deng Hua's application for getting out of the way hit a wall in front of Peng Zong, but Deng Hua was still unwilling. In his own name, he sent a telegram to Chairman Mao and the Central Military Commission, applying for abdication. When Peng Zong learned of this incident, he also called Chairman Mao and the Central Military Commission, demanding that the rank of deputy commander of the Volunteers Command remain unchanged, and that Deng Hua remain the first deputy commander, Chen Geng the second deputy commander and Song the third deputy commander. Soon, the Volunteer Command received a reply from the Central Military Commission. Chairman Mao and the Central Military Commission agreed to Peng Zong's suggestion and asked Deng Hua to continue to be the first deputy commander of the Volunteers. At this point, Deng Hua's escape plan was completely dismissed.
Chen Geng and Song are both revolutionaries who grew up in the experience of blood and fire. The party is highly disciplined, and they have the same personality characteristics, that is, humor, modesty and faithfulness. Chen Geng is modest and generous, and he is a famous "player" in the army. He speaks humorously and is easy to get along with his comrades. He can get along well with his comrades and colleagues. More importantly, Chen Geng never cares about personal fame and fortune, which can be seen from the award of 1955. The same is true of Song. The general once commented on Song: knowledgeable, well-behaved and strong in party spirit! Boss Peng disagreed with Deng Hua's application for abdication, and let Deng Hua continue to be the first deputy commander-in-chief, while Chen Geng and Song were the second and third deputy commanders-in-chief. One of the important reasons is that he knows Chen Geng and Song very well, knowing that they all have the true nature that people don't value fame and fortune.
Chen Geng and Song are both excellent commanders and fighters of our Party and army, and the Party is highly disciplined. On the Korean battlefield, regardless of personal fame and fortune, they took care of the overall situation and fully cooperated with Deng Hua's work, which made our army win good news continuously. Although Deng Hua is in the high position of the first deputy commander-in-chief, he is always modest and low-key, and has great respect for Chen Geng and Song. Nowadays, Deng Hua has taken the initiative to turn the story of the sage into a historical story, which is often talked about by later generations and has become an example for our younger generations to learn.
During his tenure as the first deputy commander of the Volunteers to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, General Deng Hua assisted Commander-in-Chief Peng in commanding all five campaigns to resist US aggression and aid Korea, and directly deployed and commanded the famous Shangganling campaign and Jincheng counterattack when General Peng returned to China to report on his work. The Battle of Shangganling fully demonstrated the military strength of China soldiers and became an excellent example of the world's adherence to defensive warfare. The counterattack in Jincheng completely extinguished the last courage of the US military and forced the United States to finally sign the armistice negotiation table. General Deng Hua made great achievements in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. His name and achievements will always be remembered by our future generations. He is a real "idol" that we learn and worship. General Deng Hua was awarded the rank of general in 1955, and General Deng Hua died in 1980 at the age of 70.