Chen Geng went to study in the Soviet Union on 1926 and returned to China in early 1927. In the same year, he participated in the Nanchang Uprising, and He Long served as a battalion commander on his way south. From 65438 to 0928, he presided over the intelligence work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Kurt in Shanghai. 193 1 9 went to the Soviet area in Hubei, Henan and Anhui, and served as the head and commander of the Fourth Army of the Chinese Red Army of Workers and Peasants. The following year, he secretly went to Shanghai for medical treatment because of serious injuries, and introduced the story of Lu Xun's Red Army's struggle in Hubei, Henan and Anhui. /kloc-0 was arrested in March, 933 and refused to be lured by Chiang Kai-shek. After the rescue, he went to the Central Soviet Area and served as the principal of Pengyang Infantry School.
During the Red Army's Long March, Chen Geng served as the head of the cadre regiment, and once led a cadre regiment to seize the ground crossing, so that the main force of the first army successfully crossed the Jinsha River. After arriving in northern Shaanxi, he served as the first division commander of the First Army Corps and participated in the battles of Zhiluo Town, Crusade, Crusade and Shanbao. 1in February, 937, he joined the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University as the captain of any team.
After the outbreak of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, he served as the brigade commander of the 386th Brigade of the Eighth Route Army129th Division, and led his troops to Taihang Mountain to participate in the battle command of Shentouling, xiang tang Pu and Changle Village, and then moved to the middle section of Pinghan Railway, northwest Shandong and southern Hebei Plain. 1940 served as commander of Taiyue Military Region, and the following year served as commander of Taiyue Column, and participated in leading the establishment of Shanxi-Hebei-Henan Anti-Japanese Base Area. 1943165438+10 went to Yan 'an to study at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 1945 was elected as alternate member of the 7th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in June.
After War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression's victory, he led Taiyue column to take part in Shangdang campaign. 1After July, 946, he led troops of Taiyue Military Region to southeast Shanxi, winning six out of six, and annihilated the first brigade of Hu Zongnan Department, the main force of Kuomintang Army, in Linfen and Fushan areas. 1August, 947, Xie Fuzhi led a main force of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, crossed the Yellow River, marched into western Henan, opened up liberated areas in Henan, Shaanxi and Hubei, and cooperated with Liu Deng and Chen Su Field Army to carry out the strategic offensive in the Central Plains. In the Huaihai Campaign, he led the fourth column, cut off the Jin-Pu Railway south of Xuzhou with the cooperation of the surrounding troops, and participated in the encirclement and suppression of the Huang Wei Corps. From 65438 to 0949, he served as commander and political commissar of the Fourth Corps. He commanded the headquarters to cross the Yangtze River and liberate Nanchang, and implemented the strategic policy of long distance, big detour and big encirclement. He entered Guangdong to pursue and annihilate the fleeing enemy, and went straight to Leizhou Peninsula to cut off Bai Chongxi's maritime retreat and cooperate with his brothers to carry out the border battle between Guangdong and Guangxi. After that, he traveled thousands of miles west to the Yunnan border, commanded the southern Yunnan campaign, and annihilated more than 20,000 Kuomintang troops who tried to flee abroad.
1February, 950, Chen Geng led his troops to Kunming, and served as deputy commander of Southwest Military Region, chairman of Yunnan Provincial People's Government and commander of Yunnan Military Region. 1In July, 950, he was invited to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to help Vietnamese soldiers and civilians fight against France and win the border battle.
195 1 year, Chen Geng participated in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and served as deputy commander of Chinese people's Volunteer Army, commander and political commissar of the Third Corps. Returned to China in June, 1952: served as the president and political commissar of the Military Engineering College of the China People's Liberation Army, and served as the deputy chief of staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in June. 1954. 1September 1958 concurrently served as deputy director of the commission of science, technology and industry for national defense. 1959 deputy minister of defense.
1955 was awarded the rank of general.
1950 At the beginning of the year, Ho Chi Minh paid a secret visit to China, met with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and exchanged views on the international situation at that time and the Vietnamese revolution. The two sides agreed to launch a border campaign first to open up the situation and open up the traffic line from Vietnam to Guangxi. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to send Chen Geng as its representative to assist President Ho Chi Minh and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam in organizing border battles and to handle all matters concerning China's military assistance to Vietnam in a unified way. Subsequently, at the request of Vietnam, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent a military advisory group headed by Wei Guoqing to Vietnam to assist in military work.
Before the border battle, Vietnam was in the most difficult stalemate stage. From the land area. Half of the liberated areas are occupied, the guerrilla areas where the two sides meet each other account for about 2/5, and the number of households in enemy-occupied areas is about110. However, in terms of military strength, the French army still has an advantage. Many large and medium-sized cities and major communication lines are still under the control of the enemy, and the liberated areas are divided into several unconnected areas; There are several small liberated areas in the southern plain and two long and narrow base areas in the central mountainous area. Peyo mountain area is the largest central base area, adjacent to the border of China, but it is tightly blocked by the enemy, and the French army keeps attacking. This central base area only has a population of more than 6.5438 million, but it has to support nearly 200,000 army cadres. Every February and March, when there is no harvest, people will go up the mountain to collect cassava, wild vegetables and wild fruits to make a living. In addition, the epidemic of malaria seriously threatens people's health, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is facing a severe test.
1On July 7th, 950, Chen Geng led a working group composed of more than ten political, military and logistics cadres, as well as a guard company and a radio station, starting from Kunming, passing through the high mountains and forests of Vietnam and North Vietnam, and heading for Taiyuan Province, where the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam is located.
It was the rainy season, the mountain road was rugged and muddy, and it was very difficult to March. Chen Geng dragged his disabled legs, endured the toothache that broke out on the way to Vietnam, and marched on foot with everyone, laughing and laughing all the way. He insisted on investigation and study, paid attention to people's lives, listened carefully to the reports of Vietnamese cadres, and tried his best to master the materials about the development history of the Vietnamese army, the status quo of the Vietnamese battlefield and the combat effectiveness of the French and Vietnamese armies.
According to Vietnamese cadres, the strategic intention of the French army at that time was to consolidate the occupied areas in the south; Maintain several major strongholds in the central part and concentrate half of the troops on "encirclement and suppression" of the main force of the Vietnamese army in the north. First of all, strengthen the Vietnam-China border defense system as an international defense line to block Vietnam and "stop the communists from going south"; At the same time, an east-west corridor will be established from Haiphong via Hanoi, Shanxi and Heping to the border of Laos, forming a situation in which the north and the south encircle and attack the central base area of Vietnam. They carried out a brutal "mopping-up" in the northern plain area with a large population and abundant food, grabbing grain and cattle, destroying crops, cutting off grain, grass and soldiers in the mountainous areas of northern Vietnam, and trying to economically trap revolutionary soldiers and civilians in the central base area and strangle the young Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
At that time, the Vietnamese armed forces were divided into main forces, local troops and guerrillas. The total number of main forces has reached a considerable figure. Although there are divisions, regiments, battalions and companies, except for one division and two independent regiments, the rest are scattered all over the country in the form of companies and battalions, and are basically guerrillas. The French army also takes battalion as its basic combat unit. Only in important strongholds or in case of major circumstances, the command troops are temporarily organized, several battalions are mobilized to fight together, and sometimes some mobile forces are concentrated to launch key "mopping up" in the liberated areas; Sometimes they drop paratroopers and suddenly attack the Vietnamese military and political authorities in the jungle. The enemy in the north, a platoon dare to station in some isolated strongholds. Enemy planes circled low in the liberated areas during the day, chasing and strafing pedestrians on the highway.
After understanding the strength comparison between France and Vietnam, Chen Geng pondered how to help the Vietnamese People's Army to open up a new situation on this basis.
On July 27th, Chen Geng and his party arrived at the Central Station of the Communist Party of Vietnam and met with President Ho Chi Minh. That evening, Ho Chi Minh and Chen Geng studied the operational policy of the border campaign together. After discussion, Ho Chi Minh and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam accepted Chen Geng's suggestion, mainly focusing on eliminating the enemy's effective strength, changing the situation that the enemy is strong and we are weak in the northern battlefield of Vietnam, striving for full initiative, first attacking some smaller enemy strongholds in order to win, accumulate experience, exercise troops and improve morale, and then gradually entering large-scale operations, adopting the method of encircling and helping, and eliminating a large number of enemy mobile troops in the field, and finally winning larger strongholds such as Gaoping and lang son.
On July 3 1 day, Chen Geng left Taiyuan City and went to Guangyuan near Gaoping, where he asked the headquarters of the Vietnamese army to meet the China military advisory group led by Wei Guoqing to jointly make a campaign plan.
At that time, there were about 13 battalions 1 1000 troops in the northeast border area of Vietnam, which were arranged on the line from Gaoping south to lang son in the north of Highway 4. The Vietnamese army has concentrated more than 20,000 troops, including most of the strategic mobile units in the central base area, ready to fight at any time.
Chen Geng put forward the following campaign guiding principles: first, fight the war of annihilation, not defeat; Second, concentrate superior forces and firepower; Third, hit the weak first, then hit the strong; Fourth, unite and help each other and strive to annihilate the enemy in the movement. Fifth, don't fight a battle that is uncertain and unprepared; Sixth, strive to win the first battle.
The specific operational arrangements are as follows: First, two main regiments attacked Dongxi stronghold on Highway No.4, with a breakthrough in the middle, and three main regiments were ready to help; Send two battalions to the south of Tanabata to stop Langer's reinforcements, leaving a small number of local troops to besiege and monitor Gaoping's enemies. If the enemy of 7-up gives assistance, destroy it in areas with favorable terrain and then occupy 7-up; If the 7-up enemy troops on the defensive can't help, we will try our best to annihilate them after the Dongxi campaign is solved. Finally, attack Gaoping with all the main forces, strive to lure the enemy to help and annihilate it in the field. The whole campaign is expected to be completed in 30-40 days.
After considering the operational plan and the whole operational process, Chen Geng promptly reported to the Central Military Commission for instructions. Mao Zedong attached great importance to the North Vietnam border campaign, personally reviewed Chen Geng's telegrams and drafted several telegrams on behalf of the Military Commission. Later, it was proved that the evolution of the war situation was completely in line with Mao Zedong's expectations. Chen Geng has answers and always holds the initiative.
After the battle plan was issued by the headquarters of the Vietnamese army, cadres at all levels talked about it and had many ideological concerns. Chen Geng answered their questions through individual talks and invited reports to more than 1000 delegations.
Some people have suggested that our strength is limited, and we should concentrate our forces to destroy the enemy of Gaoping from the beginning. Although it may cost a lot of money, it can accomplish this task. If we hit Dongxi and Qixi first and then Gaoping, we will have consumed a lot of troops by then, and I am afraid we will not be able to complete the task of liberating Gaoping and breaking through the French border blockade.
Chen Geng pointed out that to liberate Gaoping, we must first destroy the enemy's effective strength, otherwise even if we can barely capture Gaoping, we cannot consolidate it. It is much easier to attack Dongxi than Gaoping, and victory is more certain. The victory of the first battle had a great influence on the whole campaign. We have injured the enemy of Dongxi, and the enemy of Qixi and Langer may come to reinforce, which provides our army with a good opportunity to destroy the enemy in the field. Of course, our army will also consume some troops in the course of combat. As long as we are prepared to supplement in a planned way, our army will become stronger and stronger, not weaker and weaker.
It has also been suggested that the enemy suddenly attacked Gaoping from the beginning, and it was too late to reinforce. If we attack Dongxi and Qixi first, the enemy will strengthen the fortifications and forces of Gaoping stronghold and increase the difficulty of our attack.
Chen Geng said that it is surrounded by rivers on three sides and backed by mountains. The fortifications are relatively strong and there are many enemy troops on the defensive. To attack Gaoping and cross the river, only attack from one side. In this way, it is necessary to fight in depth and prepare for reinforcements. Our army lacks experience in tackling difficulties and has many difficulties. Taking the enemy by surprise may have some effect at first, but it can't solve all our tactical and technical difficulties. If some of the effective forces in the Northeast Border Region are eliminated in the East, West and Tanabata, the enemies of Gaoping will be isolated and their morale will be shaken. Our army has won many battles, gained more combat experience and gained more confidence in victory. At that time, it will not be more difficult to play Gao Ping again, but it will be easier.
Some people say that we have no continuous combat experience and poor physical strength, so I'm afraid we won't last a few battles.
Chen Geng said that in this case, it is even more important to attack the enemy's weak strongholds first. Weak first and then strong, it will become weak, and the troops have no continuous combat experience and poor physical strength. The solution is to improve food and strengthen exercise in combat practice.
Chen Geng is good at grasping key points and key issues. He personally dealt with all the key issues. He was well versed in Mao Zedong's military thoughts and made a concrete analysis of specific issues. This time, Chen Geng expounded the guiding principles of the border campaign in a popular, concrete and in-depth way in view of the ideological concerns of Vietnamese cadres. Many comrades who listened to the report said that Chen Geng gave them an incisive and vivid lesson in military dialectics, which solved the problem well.
In mid-September, the political mobilization and logistical preparations of the troops were basically completed. /kloc-at dawn on 0/6, the Vietnamese People's Army attacked several outlying strongholds near Dongxi, and the border fighting started. At dusk that day, the Vietnamese People's Army jointly attacked Dongxi with two regiments, two infantry battalions and three artillery battalions. At midnight, the front command called and said that our army had entered the city and the battle was coming to an end. Later, he said that the main position was unsuccessful and he had withdrawn from the battle before dawn.
On the morning of 17, Chen Geng personally went to the Vietnamese People's Army Command to help find out the main reason why 16 troops couldn't attack at night, mainly because commanders at all levels were afraid to come forward and the communication organization was not good. Later, they were asked to readjust their deployment and prepare for another battle.
/Kloc-On the evening of 0/7, the Vietnamese army launched a second attack on Dongxi, focusing on the north and south according to Chen Geng's suggestion. 18 at 3: 00 a.m., raided the enemy camp and finally annihilated the enemy troops on the defensive in Dongxi.
The success of the first battle of Dongxi is of great significance, which greatly inspired the simplicity of Vietnamese soldiers and civilians.